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The overall goal of this dissertation is to study important questions in public 
economics.  In its three chapters, I look at peak world oil production and its implications 
for oil prices; cross-country pollution emission rates and implications for institutional 
quality; and finally, black-white arrest rates and implications for law enforcement 
discount factors.  Each chapter of this dissertation combines new theory with robust 
empirical work to extend the quantitative frontier of research in public economics. 
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Chapter 1: The Economics of Peak Oil 
Oil is likely the most important commodity to the world economy.  Hence, the 
future paths of world oil production and world oil prices have strong implications for 
policy makers and private individuals alike.  Several models have forecasted future oil 
output levels by combining an estimate of total recoverable reserves with a deterministic 
trend in production.  Unfortunately, models that focus on total recoverable reserves and 
exogenous production trends are unable to say anything about the price that might 
accompany a given future oil production path, and they ignore the profit maximization 
problem facing oil producers.  A structural model of oil production is needed to shed light 
on both the future of world oil production and world oil prices, and the model needs to be 
quantitative in nature.  Without quantitative implications, a structural model of world oil 
production provides little more benefit to real world decision makers than a mechanistic 
model that uses a total recoverable reserve level and assumes an exogenous production 
path.  The goal of this chapter is to bring together new theory and data from the world oil 
markets to make a quantitative forecast of future world oil production and prices. 
 While mechanistic models of oil production abstract completely from world oil 
demand and producer profit maximization, such models have been remarkable effective 
at matching the oil output of particular oil producing regions, most notably the oil 
production of the United States as a whole.  Hubbert (1956) predicted that US oil 
production would peak between 1965 and 1970.   Indeed, US oil production did peak in 
1970.  Hubbert made his prediction under the assumption that cumulative oil production 
follows a logistic growth path, and his methodology has inspired numerous predictions of 
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a coming world oil shortage.1  Recently, the Energy Information Agency (EIA 2004) 
predicted in their baseline scenario that world oil production would peak in 2037 at a 
production level of 53.2 billion barrels (bbl).  This prediction is obtained by first 
estimating world total recoverable reserves and then assuming a 2% oil production 
growth rate up to peak production, followed by declining production thereafter, such that 
a constant reserve to production (RP) ratio of 10 is maintained in post-peak production 
years.  Similar to the Hubbert methodology, these assumptions are based on physical and 
historical relationships rather than economics.  The EIA (2004) makes no predictions 
about future world oil prices.  
In the economics literature, Hotelling (1931) represents the seminal work in the 
theory of non-renewable resource extraction.  In his model, production is allocated across 
time in order to equilibrate the returns on resources and the returns of other assets in the 
economy.  The result of this logic is the “Hotelling Rule,” which states that the price of 
oil is expected to rise at the rate of interest.2  Pindyck (1978) expands the theory of 
Hotelling (1931) to include exploration and finds that non-renewable production paths 
can be either always rising, always falling, or hump shaped, depending upon the structure 
of production and exploration costs and demand.  In contrast to the predictions of 
mechanistic models, the Hotelling (1931) framework never predicts unforeseen oil 
shortages, because rational expectations mean that future shortages would be anticipated 
and result in sharply increasing oil prices.  Hence, rational investors would save oil to sell 
at those high prices—undoing those future shortages.  Other notable extension of the 
                                                 
1 See Campbell (1997), Campbell and Laherrere (1998), Deffeyes (2002, 2005), and Reynolds (2002). 
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theory of non-renewable resource extraction include Mason (2001), Thompson (2001), 
Cairn and Van Quyen (1998), Van Quyen (1991), and Litzenberger and Rabinowitz 
(1995). 
Many of the theory papers cited above have an empirical component to them.  
This empirical component usually takes the form of hypothesis testing on reduced form 
equations that are implied by the theoretical model.  None of these models are 
structurally estimated using data on production, reserves and prices from a particular 
region or the world.  Survey papers such as Gately (1984) and Cremer and Salehi-
Isfahani (1991) and the Energy Modeling Forum of Stanford University (1984, 1995) 
summarize the more data-oriented side of the non-renewable resource economics 
literature.  The goals of these papers are to match the actual oil production levels we see 
from OPEC and non-OPEC countries, as well as world oil production and prices.  In 
order to do this, these models incorporate multiple types of supply and demand 
elasticities, and they focus on production rules of thumb that are consistent with 
producers who display bounded rationality.  For instance, Gately (2001) correctly 
predicts that the EIA forecast for OPEC oil production is much too high, and Gately and 
Huntington (2001) show that the price elasticity of oil demand is different for price 
increases compared to price decreases. 
While these models have rich empirical implications and predictive power they 
are, however, subject to the Lucas critique because they abstract from the explicit profit 
maximization problem that oil producers are solving.  Hence, the supply elasticities 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 This rule can be elaborated in many ways.  With extraction costs, for example, it is the scarcity rent 
portion of the price that rises at the rate of interest. 
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estimated in these models are only based on historical relationships observed in the data.  
However, it is important to remember that these historical relationships could break 
down, since the true elasticities of supply are functions of the deep parameters that 
govern the costs of oil exploration, development, and production. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to use a structural model to forecast world oil 
production and prices out into the future.  In order to do this, a structural model of non-
OPEC oil production is proposed in which exploration, development and extraction are 
each explicitly modeled.  The overall model is then estimated by simulated method of 
moments (SMM), using non-OPEC production, reserve, and discovery data from 1980-
2006.  The estimated model is then combined with OPEC-targeted market shares and an 
estimated world demand for oil, in order to produce forecasts of future equilibrium oil 
output and price levels.  The assumption that OPEC targets a specific market share is 
similar to that of Gately (2004).  In Gately (2004), however, the reference case for non-
OPEC oil production is taken as exogenous according to EIA estimates.  Neither Gately 
(2004) nor the EIA (2004) model the profit maximization problem facing non-OPEC oil 
producers.  
 This chapter makes two main contributions to the literature.  First, this chapter 
provides the first structural estimation of worldwide non-OPEC oil production.   Second, 
it uses this structural model of oil production and an estimated demand for world oil to 
forecast equilibrium oil output and price levels into the future.  In the model presented in 
this chapter, the demand for oil interacts with resource scarcity to generate endogenously 
equilibrium oil prices and exploration, development and extraction activity.  Thus, this 
chapter combines the structural modeling of the theoretical resource literature with the 
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forecasting and data emphasis from the empirical literature on world oil supply and 
demand. 
The finding here is that world conventional oil production is likely to peak around 
the year 2045 at an annual production level of 52 billion bbl.  The baseline forecast in this 
chapter is similar to a 2004 EIA forecast that predicts a peak in world oil production in 
the year 2037 at an annual production level of 53.2 billion bbl.  The EIA predicts a sharp 
decline in production after 2037, while this chapter finds that production will likely 
remain relatively flat both before and after the peak production year.  The baseline 
forecast here is that world oil production will remain above 50 billion bbl for nearly two 
decades.  The results in this chapter are also strictly at odds with impending world oil 
shortage scenarios forecasted by those using the methodology of Hubbert (1956).   
This chapter also finds that equilibrium world oil prices are likely to fall 
substantially from their recent highs.  This chapter forecasts that real oil prices will return 
to levels similar to those observed in the 1990s.  However, real oil prices will begin a 
gradual rise starting in about 2025.  The upward trend in real oil prices continues for most 
of the century before leveling off at price of over $80/bbl in 2000 constant dollars. 
 This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 1.1 presents the model, while 
Section 1.2 presents the result of the in-sample estimation using data from 1980-2006.  
Section 1.3 presents the forecasts for equilibrium world oil production and prices for the 





 In modeling the representative non-OPEC oil producer, I assume that three 
separate decision makers interact in the production process.  In chronological order, the 
exploration manager first searches for new oil discoveries, the development manager 
decides when to drill new oil wells, and finally, the production manager extracts the oil.  
In considering whether or not to explore another oil field, however, the exploration 
manager takes into account the value that will subsequently be created by the actions of 
the development and production managers.  Likewise, in deciding whether or not to drill 
another well, the development manager takes into account the value that the production 
manager will create through his choices about extraction.  Since the decisions of the 
managers who act first, depend upon the value created by the managers who act later, the 
presentation of the model proceeds in reverse chronological order. 
 
1.1.1 The Production Manager’s Problem 
 Given a drilled well, the production manager seeks to maximize the expected 








D β+Π=  
(1.2) ),()',,( rxcPxrrP −=Π  
(1.3) 'rrx −=  
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In equations (1.1-1.3),  VD  is the maximum value of a drilled well,  P  is the current real 
oil price,  r  is recoverable reserves,  x  is the amount of oil extracted,  β  is the discount 
factor common to all managers and  c  is the total cost of extraction.  A prime denotes 
next period’s variables.  Lower case letters denote an individual manager’s variables, 
whereas upper case letters denote aggregate variables.3 
 The extraction cost function used in this chapter is: 
(1.4) 210 )(),( xrcxcrxc −+= ψ . 
In this equation,  c0  is the constant cost per unit of extraction that is independent of the 
level of reserves, while  ψ  is the fraction of reserves such that the product  ψ r  equals 
the cost-minimizing extraction  level.  Positive values of  c1  impose a penalty when 
extraction,  x,  deviates from the cost-minimizing extraction level  ψ r. 
Havlena and Odeh (1963, 1964) show that the material balance equation as 
applied to oil reservoirs can be written as: 
(1.5) wewfgo BWEmEErx +++= )( , , 
where  Eo  represents the expansion of oil and dissolved gas,  m  is the ratio of the pore 
volume of the gascap to the pore volume of oil,  Eg  represents the expansion of the 
gascap,  Ef,w  represents expansion of water and the reduction of hydrocarbon pore 
volume,  We  is the cumulative water influx into the oil reservoir, and  Bw  is the water 
volume in the oil formation.4  
                                                 
3 One exception to this notation rule is the real price of oil.  Upper case  P  denotes the real price of oil 
which is an aggregate variable, but lower case  p  is the log of the real price of oil (which is also an 
aggregate variable). 
4 When a production well is drilled into an oil reservoir, a pressure difference arises between the surface 
and the reservoir.  If this pressure difference is great enough, oil will flow naturally from the reservoir to 
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Havlena and Odeh show that in many cases equation (1.5) can be interpreted as a 
linear function.  In a pure gas drive well, for instance, the absence of water means  Ef,w = 
0  and  Bw = 0,then equation (1.5) reduces to: 
(1.6) )( go mEErx += . 
Thus, in this case, the extraction level is determined by the natural expansion of oil and 
dissolved gas, and the expansion of the gascap scaled by the gascap to oil pore volume 
ratio.   
Another example of a case where equation (1.5) reduces to a linear function of 
reserves is in a well with limited water influx.  In these wells  We = 0, and equation (1.5) 
reduces to: 
(1.7) )( ,wfgo EmEErx ++= . 
Hence, in all cases where water is either absent or the water influx is minimal, the natural 
flow of oil to the surface is just a linear function of the remaining reserves.  Thus, the 
parameter  ψ  is the percentage of reserves that naturally flow to the surface based upon 
the average geology of non-OPEC oil formations.  Production can deviate from  ψ r,  but 
only at a cost of 21 )( xrc −ψ . 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the surface.  The natural rate of flow is determined by the physical properties of the fluids in the reservoir 
and the pressure differential created by the production well.  Commonly, the top of a reservoir contains a 
gascap of natural gas, the middle contains oil, and the bottom contains water.  Of course reservoirs also 
contain rocks and other solids.  The pore volume represents the fluid volume of a reservoir.  As oil in the 
reservoir is pumped out, the gascap and water table expand, maintaining much of the pressure differential 
around the production well. 
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1.1.2 The Development Manager’s Problem 
 Given the past discoveries of oil by the exploration manager and the future value 
to be created by the production manager, the problem facing the development manger is a 
discrete choice decision of whether or not to drill a new well.  Hence, the optimization 
problem facing the development manager is: 





UD ββ −= .  
In this equation,  VUD  is the maximum value of an un-drilled well, and  w  is the cost of 
drilling a new well.  The fixed cost of drilling,  w, differs across development managers; 
the development manager each period draws a new  w  from an independent and identical 
distribution.  The possible drilling costs,  w,  are described by a uniform distribution: 
(1.9) ),0(~ WUw . 
The uniform distribution for drilling cost is similar to the uniform production cost 
assumption of Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995).   
The purpose of heterogeneity in the drilling costs is to allocate the development of 
total reserves amongst various development managers in a tractable and realistic manner.  
If the expected discounted value of an un-drilled well next period is greater than the 
expected value of deciding to drill today, then the development manager decides not to 
drill another production well.  Also, in equation (1.8) the value of a drilled well,  VD,  is 
discounted by one period in order to account for real world construction lag times 
between the decision to drill and the completion of a new oil well. 
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1.1.3 The Exploration Manager’s Problem 
 The problem facing the exploration manager is either to explore a new field in the 
current period or leave it unexplored for the next period.  The value of an unexplored a 
field is determined by two factors.  One factor is the recoverable reserves expected to be 
discovered if the field is explored.  These reserves determine the optimal number of new 
wells that can be drilled.  The second factor is the cost of exploring the field.  Thus the 














In this equation,  VUF  is the maximum value of an unexplored field,  f  is the fixed cost of 
exploring a field,  N  is the number of oil firms that enter to explore in a given period, and  
CD  is the cumulative discoveries of oil to date.  Also,  n  is a random variable realized 
after the field has been explored that represents the number of new wells that can be 
drilled on a field.  The random variable  n  is assumed to be distributed log-normal: 
(1.11) ),1(~ nLogNn σ . 
The variable  n  is assumed to be log-normal so that discoveries are non-negative 
and distributed with curvature.  If the exploration manager chooses to explore the field, 
then the payoff is the expected discounted value of the number of wells likely to be 
discovered times the value of an un-drilled well  ( )]',,'([|,',' wrPVnE
UD
PnwP ⋅β )  less the 
fixed cost of exploration  (f(N,CD)).  If the exploration manager chooses not to explore 
the field, then the payoff is the expected discounted value of an unexplored field in the 




 Note that the left-hand side of equation (1.10) implies that the maximum value of 
an unexplored field,  VUF, depends on four factors: the price,  P,  the recoverable reserve 
level,  r,  the number of  firms that enter to explore,  N,  and the cumulative discoveries to 
date,  CD.  The price and recoverable reserve level are both stationary variables.  
However, the number of firms that enter and the cumulative discoveries are not.  Thus, in 
order to solve the model, it is essential that the fixed cost of oil exploration can be solved 
as a function of the stationary variables alone.  
 
1.1.4 Competitive Equilibrium 
 I assume that non-OPEC oil companies are competitive, and that entry is free at 
the exploration stage.  With free entry, the value of an unexplored field must equal zero, 
and then the expected discounted value of an un-drilled well must equal the fixed cost of 
exploration.  Hence, in a competitive equilibrium with free entry, the following equation 
must hold in all periods and all states. 
(1.12)  ),()]',,'([|,',' CDNfwrPVnE
UD
PnwP =⋅β  
Thus, the fixed cost of exploration is only a function the stationary variables  P,  r,  and  
w.  In equilibrium, the fixed cost of oil exploration is also a stationary variable. 
The following functional form assumption is made about the fixed cost of 
exploration: 
(1.13) )]/(exp[),( 210 CDCDNCDNf γγ += . 
This functional form is chosen for two reasons.  First, the fixed cost of exploration is 
increasing and convex in  N.  This assumption is made since it is likely that, all else 
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equal, more entrants raise the exploration costs for all firms.  This reflects the fact that the 
inputs to exploration, such as drill bits and petroleum engineers, are likely to be capacity 
constrained in a given period.  Second, it allows for the cost of exploration to be either 
increasing or decreasing in cumulative discoveries, depending on the level of  CD  and 
the values of γ0  and  γ1. 
Using the cumulative discoveries to date, the number of firms that enter in 






e ⋅+= βγγ  
Equation (1.14) details the equilibrium number of firms that must enter to explore fields 
in order to ensure that the zero expected profit condition holds every period.  New 
discoveries for a period are determined by the number of entrants  (Ne)  and the 
realization of the stochastic discoveries variable  (n).  This model has no upperbound on 
cumulative discoveries.  Discoveries in every period are determined endogenously by the 
number of entrants necessary to keep the cost of exploration, ),( CDNf , equal to the 
benefits of exploration, )]',,'([|,',' wrPVnE
UD
PnwP ⋅β . 
 
1.1.5 Solving the Model 
 In order to solve the model for the decision rules of the three managers 
(production, development and exploration), it is necessary to determine the expectations 
for future prices.  I assume that non-OPEC oil producers expect log real oil prices to 
follow a stationary auto-regressive process with one lag, AR(1). 
 13 
(1.15) tppptpt pp ,1 )( εµµρ ++−= −  
(1.16) ),0(~ 2pp N σε  
In equation (1.15), the variable  p  represents the log real oil price,  ρp  is the auto-
correlation in log real oil prices,  µp  is the mean log real oil price, and  εp  is a normally 
distributed, independent shock to real oil prices. 
 
Table 1.1: Log Real Oil Prices 
Parameter Coef Std Err
µ p 2.8921 0.1709
ρ p 0.9051 0.0359
σ p 0.2193 0.0114  
 
Equation (1.15) is estimated using average annual real oil prices from 1870 – 
2006.  Average annual nominal oil prices are obtained from the EIA, and those nominal 
prices are deflated by the US GDP deflator with a base year of 2000.  The results from 
the estimation are displayed in Table 1.1. 
The coefficient estimates in Table 1.1 are all statistically different from zero and 
measured with a high degree of precision.  The estimate of  µp  is 2.8921 which 
corresponds to a real oil price of 18.03 in constant 2000 US dollars.  The estimate of  ρp  
equal to 0.9051 indicates that real oil prices have a high degree of persistence, but it does 
not imply a unit root or non-stationary process for real oil prices.  In fact, using an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, one can reject the presence of a unit root at the 1% level.  
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The results from Table 1.1 are then used to create a ten-state Markov process using the 
method described in Tauchen and Hussey (1991).  This discrete Markov process 
describes the representative non-OPEC oil producer’s expectations about future real oil 
prices. 
 With expectations of future prices determined, the decision rules for the three 
managers’ problems are solved numerically using value function iteration.  These 
decision rules are then combined with a set of initial conditions to simulate the model 
over time.  To estimate the model parameters, the simulations from the model are then 
compared to the data on non-OPEC oil production, reserves and discoveries. 
 
1.2 ESTIMATION OF NON-OPEC OIL PRODUCTION 
 Except for the discount factor,  β,  and the constant cost of extraction,  c0,  all the 
model parameters described in Section 1.1 are estimated using SMM according to the 
strategy outlined in Lee and Ingram (1991).  The discount factor is set to 0.9, consistent 
with the findings of Adelman (1993), and the constant cost of extraction is set equal to 
0.75, which is consistent with the findings of the EIA (2006).  I define the vector  θ   to 
contain the six model parameters to be estimated: 
(1.17) },,,,,{ 101 γγσψθ nWc= . 
The model can be fully solved and simulated over time for any given values of the 
parameter vector  θ,  a realization of prices, a level of cumulative discoveries, a number 
of drilled wells and a number of undrilled wells. 
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1.2.1 Overview of Simulation Procedure 
The number of firms that enter to explore oil fields in each period can be 
determined according to equation (1.14).  The number of entrants in a given period and 
the realization of the random variable  n  determine the new oil discoveries for each 
period.  The new oil discoveries plus the number of undrilled wells remaining from the 
previous period determines the total possible number of new wells that can be drilled.  
Given the total number of new wells that could be drilled, the decision rules from the 
development manager’s problem, and the realization of the stochastic drilling cost,  w,  
determines the actual number of new wells drilled in each period.  Using their own 
decision rules, production managers optimally choose the extraction levels both for newly 
drilled wells and for wells drilled in previous periods.  These extraction levels can be 
combined to create an aggregate oil production time series,  X.  In addition, a time series 
of aggregate discoveries,  D,  can be recovered from the number of exploration entrants 
and the realizations of  n.  Finally, a time series of aggregate reserves,  R,  can be 
calculated by summing the number of reserves remaining within drilled and undrilled 
wells.  These three time series plus the simulated price time series are used to calculate 
moments from the model.  The model moments are then compared to actual non-OPEC 
data moments in order to update the parameter vector  θ. 
 
1.2.2 Non-OPEC Data and Moments 
While non-OPEC oil production data are available back to 1965, non-OPEC 
reserve data are only available starting in 1980.  Hence, the moments used to estimate the 
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model come from the period 1980-2006 and are the following: the average growth rate of 
production  µ(gX), the standard deviation of the growth rate of production  σ(gX),  the 
average growth rate of reserves  µ(gR), the standard deviation of the growth rate of 
reserves  σ(gR),  the correlation between production and prices  ρ(X,P),  the correlation 
between production and discoveries  ρ(X,D), and the coefficients,  b0  and  b1,  from 
regressing discoveries on cumulative discoveries and cumulative discoveries squared.5  
All data on non-OPEC reserves and production come from the BP Statistical Review 
(2007).  Non-OPEC discoveries are calculated using the following identity: 
(1.18) XRRD +−= ' . 
Hence, aggregate non-OPEC discoveries represent both the reserve growth at entirely 
new fields and the reserve growth due to improved recovery technologies.  This enables 
the estimation of the model to capture both important sources of reserve growth. 
 The vector of differenced moments used in the minimization routine is: 
(1.19) ))(()()( θθ YHZHg S−= , 
where the matrix  Z  contains the aggregate variables,  X,  R,  D,  and  P,  from the data on 
non-OPEC oil production, reserves, discoveries and real oil prices in constant 2000 US 
dollars.  The function  H  transforms the aggregate variables from the data in matrix  Z  
into the sample data moments.  The matrix  Y  contains the aggregate variables,  X,  R,  D,  
and  P,  from the simulations of the model.  Those aggregate variables are a function of 
                                                 
5 Specifically, the coefficients  b0  and  b1  come from running a regression, 
2
10 CDbCDbD += , 
where  D  is discoveries and  CD is cumulative discoveries. 
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the model parameters  θ.  The function  HS  transforms the matrix  Y  into the simulated 
moments from the model. 
 The following optimization routine is used to estimate the model parameters. 




The matrix  Ω  is the optimal weighting matrix for the criterion function, )()'( 1 θθ gg −Ω .  
In this chapter, an estimate of  Ω  is obtained by using a jackknife procedure to estimate 
variance-covariance matrix of the data moments as described in Greene (2003).  The 
model parameters that minimize equation (1.18) are found using the simplex algorithm of 
Nelder and Mead (1965). 
 
1.2.3 Estimation Results 
 Table 1.2 displays the targeted moments from the data and the same moments 
calculated from simulating the model using the parameter vector that minimized equation 
(1.20).  The optimized model is able to match most of the moments very well.  The model 
displays a lower standard deviation in the growth rate of reserves (1.28%) than does the 
data (2.64%).  Also, the correlations  ρ(X,P)  and ρ(X,D) are higher in the model than in 
the data.  The differences between the model moments and the non-OPEC data moments 





Table 1.2: Moments 
Moment Non-OPEC Data Model Simulation
µ(g X ) 1.10% 0.98%
σ(g X ) 1.55% 2.14%
µ(g R ) 1.01% 1.03%
σ(g R ) 2.64% 1.28%
ρ(X,P ) -0.0478 0.1863
ρ(X,D ) 0.2013 0.4499
b 0 0.0326 0.0356
b 1 -9.50E-06 -1.43E-05  
 
First, the model only contains two aggregate shocks: the random component of 
prices and the random component of discoveries.  In the data, however, other factors 
outside of fluctuations in prices and discoveries are likely to influence the time series of 
non-OPEC oil production, reserves and discoveries.  Hence, it is natural to expect the 
correlations  ρ(X,P)  and ρ(X,D)  to be higher in the model than in the data.  The model is 
able to match the stronger correlation between oil production and discoveries, relative to 
the correlation between production and prices that we see in the data.  In addition, the 
correlation between oil production and prices is the moment measured with the highest 
degree of statistical uncertainty.  The correlation between oil production and prices has a 
coefficient of variation over eighty times larger than any other moment.  Hence, that 
moment receives the least weight in the minimization of the criterion function.   
The second reason that the moments from the model differ from those in the data 
is the degree to which non-OPEC oil production deviates from perfect competition.  
Under perfect competition, the standard deviation in the growth rate of production will 
almost always be above the standard deviation in the growth rate of reserves.  This is 
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because fluctuating oil production with prices increases profits, while changing oil 
reserve levels does not.  However, if production decisions are influenced by slow moving 
regulatory controls, it could reverse the relative sizes of the standard deviation of the 
growth rate of production and the standard deviation of the growth rate of reserves. 
 Table 1.3 reports the point estimate and standard errors for the model parameters.  
In the model, a unit of extraction is taken to be 1,000 barrels (bbls).  Hence, the point 
estimate for  c1  corresponds to a $111.17 penalty in constant 2000 US dollars for a 1,000 
bbl deviation from the cost-minimizing extraction rate of  ψ r.  The point estimate for  W  
indicates a uniform distribution for  w  between zero and 936.  In other words, the 
maximum drilling cost for a single well is approximately $936 per 1,000 bbl of reserves.  
Thus, in the model, the cost of drilling a well over an oil reservoir of million bbl would 
range from zero to almost a million dollars. 
 
Table 1.3: Model Parameters 
Parameter Point Est Std Err





γ1 -2.04E-08 5.94E-09  
 
 The point estimate for  ψ  of 0.0711 implies that the average cost-minimizing 
extraction rate for non-OPEC wells is 7.11% of remaining reserves.  The point estimate 
for  σn  of 0.14628 implies that oil exploration yields actual discoveries that have 
 20 
approximately a 14.6% standard deviation around the mean discovery level.  Finally, the 
positive point estimate of  γ0  and the negative point estimate of  γ1, combined with the 
current cumulative discoveries to date, indicate that non-OPEC oil exploration will 
continue to experience entry, at least in the short term.  All of the parameter estimates are 
well identified by the moments and are statistically different from zero at any standard 
level of significance. 
 
1.2.4 Simulating the Estimated Model In-Sample 1980-2006 
 Figure 1.1 displays the result from the in-sample simulation for non-OPEC oil 
production.  The line denoted as ‘X data,’ shows the actual level of non-OPEC aggregate 
oil production from 1980-2006.  The line denoted as ‘X sim,’ shows the level of 
aggregate oil production generated by the simulated model, when the actual real oil prices 
and non-OPEC discoveries over the period 1980-2006 are fed into the model as inputs.  
The model parameters are set equal to their point estimates in Table 1.3.  In order to 
initialize the simulation, the model is calibrated to match the oil production in all 
previous periods exactly. 
 As can be seen in Figure 1.1, the model captures the general movement in non-
OPEC production quite well.  The correlation between the growth rate in aggregate oil 
production in the model and in the data is strong at 0.441.  The model displays higher oil 
production levels than the data in high price periods like the early 1980s and 2004-2006, 
and lower oil production level in low price periods like the latter half of the 1990s.  This 
difference might be expected, however, given the higher correlation of production and 
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prices present in the model relative to the data, as discussed earlier.  It should be noted 
that non-linear least squares is not used in the estimation process.  Hence, none of the 
model parameters are chosen to match the oil production curve in Figure 1.1.  The model 
parameters are chosen to match the non-OPEC data moments displayed in Table 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.1: In-Sample Non-OPEC Oil Production 
 
 
 Next, Figure 1.2 displays the result from the in-sample simulation for non-OPEC 
oil reserves.  The line denoted as ‘R data,’ shows the actual level of non-OPEC oil 
reserves from 1980-2006.  The line denoted as ‘R sim,’ shows the level of oil reserves 
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generated by the model.  Whereas Figure 1.1 displays the flow of oil from the model and 
the data, Figure 1.2 displays the stock.  Hence, the difference between the reserve levels 
in the model and the data represent the cumulative oil production differential between the 
model and the data.  As expected from the Figure 1.1, the relatively higher oil production 
in the model in the early 1980s creates lower reserve levels in the model when compared 
to the data.  The reserve levels in the model then rise above those in the data as the 
production in the model falls relative to the oil production in the data. 
 




1.3 FORECASTING FUTURE WORLD OIL PRODUCTION AND PRICES 
 In order to forecast future oil production and prices, dynamic oil supply and 
demand functions must be derived.  The results from Section 1.2 demonstrate that the 
model defined in Section 1.1 does a good job of replicating some of the key features of 
the non-OPEC oil data.  However, a model of world oil production requires a modeling 
choice about future OPEC oil production.  This model of world oil supply must then be 
brought together with a world demand for oil in order to forecast equilibrium oil prices 
and production levels. 
 
1.3.1 OPEC Oil Production 
 Following the methodology of Gately (2004), this chapter assumes that OPEC 
seeks to target a specific share of the world oil market.  This assumption is made for four 
reasons.  First, as shown in Figure 1.3, OPEC’s share of the world oil market has been 
fairly constant over time.  OPEC’s market share from 1965-2006 has averaged around 
42% of world oil production, and this market share has been extremely stable since 1992. 
Second, OPEC’s commitment to collude and exercise market power varies over time.  
Hence, it is extremely difficult to model the complex game that OPEC members play, not 
only with the rest of the world, but also amongst themselves.  Third, it is not at all clear 
that OPEC is a profit maximizer.  Oil revenues make up a substantial portion of 
government receipts for OPEC member countries.  Thus, to the extent that insurance is 
less than complete, they may value oil revenue certainty in addition to profits.  Fourth, at 
least in the case of the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo, OPEC seems to have made production 
decisions largely for political reasons.  Hence, it is difficult to know how even to model 
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the payoffs to OPEC member countries, when different oil production levels help to 
satisfy different competing goals. 
 
Figure 1.3: OPEC’s Share of World Oil Production 
 
 
Nonetheless, endogenizing OPEC’s production response certainly represents a 
worthy extension to the work presented here.  For clarity and tractability, however, this 
chapter focuses on exogenous OPEC market shares.  For my analysis, three exogenous 
OPEC market share processes are considered.  In the baseline model, OPEC market 
shares are assumed to remain constant at their historic average of 42% of world oil 
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production.  For two possibilities that bound the assumption of stability, I consider the 
case where OPEC's fraction of the world oil market drops by 0.5% each year, and another 
where OPEC’s market share increases by 0.5% each year. 
 
1.3.2 World Oil Demand and World Economic Growth 
 The supply side of the world oil market is defined by combining the structural 
model of non-OPEC oil production estimated in Section 1.2 with each of the three market 
share assumptions about OPEC oil production.  However, in order to forecast equilibrium 
world oil prices and production into the future, the demand side of the model must be 
estimated as well.  The structure of the estimated world oil demand is: 
(1.21) tDtttDtD GPQQ ,321,10, )log()log()log( εαααα ++++= − . 
In this equation,  QD,t  represents the quantity of oil demanded in period  t,  P  is the real 
price of oil,  G  is world economic growth calculated as first differenced log world gross 
domestic product, and  εD  is the error term in the world oil demand equation. 
 
Table 1.4: World Oil Demand 
Variable Coefficient Std Err
log(Q D, t -1) 0.9837 0.0050
log(P t ) -0.0358 0.0078
G t 1.7033 0.2270
Constant 0.1191 0.0284  
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Table 1.4 displays the result from estimation of equation (1.21).  The coefficients 
in Table 1.4 are estimated using ordinary least squares, and the standard errors are 
adjusted for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error term using the 
method of Newey and West (1987).  The coefficient on lagged demand of 0.9837 implies 
that world oil demand is extremely persistent from one period to the next.  However, the 
hypothesis that the coefficient on lagged demand is equal to one is rejected at the 5% 
level.  The coefficient on log real oil prices implies that a 1% increase in real oil prices 
reduces world oil demand by 0.0358% in that same period.  Hence, only large price 
changes have meaningful effects on world oil demand.  The coefficient on economic 
growth of 1.7033 implies that a 100 basis point increase in world economic growth would 
increase world oil demand by just over 1 billion bbl. 
World economic growth is assumed to follow an AR(1) process described by: 
(1.22) tGGtGGt GG ,1 )( εµρµ +−+= − . 
In this equation,  µG  is the mean growth rate in world output,  ρG  is the auto correlation 
in world output growth, and  εG  represents independent shocks to world economic 
growth that are distributed ),0( 2GN σ .   The AR(1) process in equation (1.22) is estimated 
over the period 1965 – 2003 using the data on real world output from Maddison (2003). 
 
Table 1.5: World Economic Growth 
Parameter Point Est Std Err
µ G 0.0388 0.0028
ρ G 0.4202 0.1242
σ G 0.0119 0.0012  
 27 
 The results from estimating equation (1.22) are displayed in Table 1.5.  The 
estimated mean growth rate for world output is 3.88%, and the estimated autocorrelation 
is 0.42.  Both estimates are squarely within the range of estimates found from doing 
similar analysis at the country level.  All parameters are estimated with a high degree of 
precision and are statistically significant at any standard level.  With the estimated 
equation for world oil demand and the estimated law of motion for world output growth 
in hand, the model is now closed and can be brought into equilibrium to forecast future 
oil production and prices. 
 
1.3.3 Equilibrium World Oil Production and Price Forecast 
 In order to forecast world oil production and prices into the future, 300 Monte 
Carlo simulations are preformed.  The Monte Carlo simulations enable the forecast to 
capture three different types of uncertainty.  The first type is uncertainty in the future 
productivity of oil exploration activity.  Oil exploration over the next century could yield 
discoveries that are well above expectations or well below expectations.  In the model 
presented in Section 1.2, this type of uncertainty is captured by the parameter  σn,  which 
is estimated at 0.1463, implying that the standard deviation in discovery outcomes around 
expectations is about 15%.   
The second type of uncertainty that needs to be included is uncertainty in future 
world economic growth.  Recent growth in the developing world, especially strong 
growth in China and India, has shown that above trend economic growth can quickly put 
strong pressure on the world oil markets, pushing up prices and the incentives to explore, 
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develop, and produce oil.  This type of uncertainty is captured by taking draws from the 
estimated AR(1) process for world economic growth displayed in equation (1.22), and 
feeding those growth rates into the demand for world oil estimated in equation (1.21).   
The third source of uncertainty the Monte Carlo simulations account for is the 
uncertainty in the estimates of the model parameters displayed in Table 1.3.  This form of 
uncertainty is captured by taking draws from the estimated joint distribution of the model 
parameters.  The estimated variance-covariance matrix of the model parameters is listed 
in the appendix. 
Before performing the Monte Carlo simulations, the price expectations for non-
OPEC oil producers for the next 100 years need to be defined.  One could continue to use 
the price expectations derived from the estimation of equation (1.15) in Section 1.2 using 
past real oil price data.  Those parameter estimates are displayed in Table 1.1.  However, 
in that case the expectations for future prices would not necessarily match the forecasted 
equilibrium prices generated by the model.   
In order to ensure that price expectations used by the non-OPEC exploration, 
development and production managers are consistent with prices generated in 
equilibrium, the following strategy is employed.  First, non-OPEC oil managers are 
assumed to continue to expect log real oil prices to follow the AR(1) process described in 
equation (1.15).  Second, I iterate on the parameter values of equation (1.15) until the a 
priori price expectations match the realized equilibrium price forecast generated by the 
model. Hence, the equilibrium oil production and price forecasts are constructed as 
follows: (i) guess the parameter values,  µp,  ρp  and  σp,  from equation (1.15), (ii) 
forecast equilibrium production and prices in 300 separate Monte Carlo simulations in 
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order to account for uncertainty, (iii) estimate equation (1.15) on the forecasted prices, 
and (iv) update  µp,  ρp  and  σp  until convergence is reached. 
Quantitatively, both sets of price expectations generate similar results.  The price 
expectations derived in Section 1.2 produce oil production forecasts that are slightly more 
peaked than price expectations that are consistent with the equilibrium price forecasts 
generated by the model. 
 
1.3.4 Baseline Forecast: Constant OPEC Market Share 
 Figure 1.4 displays three forecasts of world oil production over the next 100 
years: the EIA (2004) forecast, a forecast using methodology of Hubbert (1956), and the 
equilibrium production forecast generated by the model presented in this chapter.  My 
baseline forecast is made under the assumption that OPEC continues to target its historic 
market share of 42% of world oil production.  The constant OPEC market share and the 
structural model of non-OPEC production estimated in Section 1.2 combine to pin down 
the supply side of the world oil market.  World oil supply is equated to world oil demand 
each period by adjusting the equilibrium world oil price.6 
 The single line, from 1900–2006, displays historic world oil production.  In 2007, 
the line splits into three separate forecasts of world oil production.  The dotted line 
labeled “EIA,” displays the EIA’s baseline scenario for peak world oil production.  The 
EIA forecasts that world oil production will peak in the year 2037 at a production level of 
                                                 
6 Note that in order to solve for the decision rules of the non-OPEC managers’ problems it is necessary to 
have a discrete grid for oil prices.  However, this means that markets will never perfectly clear since prices 
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53.2 billion bbl.  The EIA forecast is based on a mean estimated total recoverable reserve 
level of 3 trillion bbl, a 2% production growth rate, and production decline thereafter, in 
which a constant reserve to production (RP) ratio of 10 is maintained.  The mean forecast 
in this chapter is represented by a dashed line labeled “Mean,” and it forecasts a peak 
production year of 2045 at a production level of 52 billion bbl.  The production forecast 
in this chapter is strictly at odds with the production forecasts of those using the 
methodology of Hubbert (1956).  Forecasts using the Hubbert model have predicted a 
peak in world oil production every year since 2000.  The construction of the Hubbert 
forecast is presented in the appendix. 
The main difference between the mean forecast in this chapter and the EIA 
forecast is the shape of the production path around the peak production year.  In the EIA 
forecast, production growth does not slow at all as it approaches the peak production 
year.  Hence, in the EIA forecast, the drop off in production after the peak production 
year is rather pronounced, due to the assumption of a fixed reserve base and the 
assumption of a constant RP ratio of 10 in post peak production years.  In my model, 
production growth slows well before the peak production year.  This is because the 
growth in the number of entrants into the oil industry necessary to satisfy equation (1.14) 
falls as cumulative discoveries increase. 
In essence, equation (1.14) combined with the parameter estimates for  γ0  and  γ1  
imply increasing resource scarcity even though no explicit cap is imposed on total 
recoverable reserves.  The slowing growth rate in world oil production also causes 
                                                                                                                                                 
are not continuous.  Excess supply/demand can be brought arbitrarily close to zero by increasing the 
number of discrete points in the price grid but this has a high cost in terms of computational time.   
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equilibrium world oil prices to rise.  Hence, production levels in the model stay above 50 
billion barrels for nearly a decade after the peak production year, as higher prices 
counteract the forces of increasing resource scarcity.  The 95% confidence interval 
implies that peak oil production, under a constant OPEC market share 42%, is likely to 
occur between the years 2033-2068 at a production level of 40.1 to 83.9 billion bbl. 
 
Figure 1.4: World Oil Production Constant OPEC Market Share 
 
 
As discussed in Section 1.1, the model presented in this chapter has no 
upperbound on total recoverable reserves.  However, another implication of equation 
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(1.14), the estimated values for  γ0  and  γ1, and the estimated world demand for oil is that 
eventually equilibrium world oil production will begin to approach zero.  Hence, an 
implied total recoverable reserve level can be calculated by simulating the model 
sufficiently far into the future.  Under a constant OPEC market share scenario, the mean 
production forecast implies a total recoverable reserve level of 5 trillion bbl.  This is 
almost two trillion more total recoverable reserves than the EIA’s mean estimate of 3 
trillion bbl and just over one trillion more reserves than the upperbound on the EIA’s 
95% confidence interval of 3.9 trillion bbl.   
According to the EIA estimate, the 5 trillion bbl total recoverable reserve level 
implied by the model seems unreasonable high.  This could reflect that OPEC’s share of 
the world oil market is likely to decline over time or that the model parameters are biased 
towards an overly optimistic production forecast.  Both the lower bound on the 95% 
confidence interval in the constant OPEC market share case and the mean forecast in the 
decreasing OPEC market share case imply a total recoverable reserve level within the 
EIA’s range of estimates for total recoverable reserves.  While either of these 
interpretations could be correct, it is important to note that the majority of the difference 
in total recoverable reserves between those implied by the mean production forecast in 
Figure 1.4 and the EIA estimate come after the year 2050.  While geological estimates of 
total recoverable reserves try to explicitly account for technology growth, it is hard to 
forecast what future recovery rates will be in practice.  The EIA (2004) assumes a 
recovery factor of about 50%.  In other words, of the 6 trillion bbl of physical 
conventional oil present in the Earth’s crust only 50% of those, or 3 trillion bbl, will be 
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translated into recoverable oil reserves.  The mean forecast in the constant OPEC market 
share case in this chapter implies a recovery factor of 83%. 
 
Figure 1.5: Real Oil Prices Constant OPEC Market Share 
 
 
 Figure 1.5 displays the model’s forecast of world oil prices over the next 100 
years.  The single line, from 1900-2006, displays historic average annual real oil prices in 
constant 2000 dollars.  The mean forecast calls for real oil prices to fall from their recent 
highs, to a level of about $25/bbl in constant 2000 dollars over the next decade.  Under 
the mean forecast, real oil prices begin to rise slowly starting in about 2025.  Real oil 
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prices continue to increase as world production peaks, before leveling off at a price of 
just over $80/bbl in constant 2000 dollars.  If world oil production is at the low end of the 
model’s forecast, then real oil prices can be expected to stay near current levels before 
increasing to a price of over $160/bbl over the next 100 years.  However, if world oil 
production is at the high end of the model’s forecast, then oil prices could return to the 
low levels seen in the late 1990s, with modest price increases only beginning after the 
year 2050. 
 
1.3.5 World Oil Production and Price Forecast: Declining OPEC Market Share 
 Figure 1.6 displays the model’s forecast of world oil production over the next 100 
years under the assumption that OPEC’s targeted market share decreases by 0.5% each 
year from its level of just under 42% in 2006.  As in the baseline model, the declining 
OPEC market share and the structural model of non-OPEC oil production combine to 
make up the supply side of the world oil market.  World oil supply is equated to world oil 
demand by adjusting the equilibrium world oil price. 
With OPEC’s market share of world oil production declining over time, the peak 
in world production occurs much faster and at a lower level.  The mean forecast is for 
world oil production to peak in the year 2035 at an annual production level of just over 
45 billion bbl.  As in the baseline forecast, the oil production level around the peak 
production year is relatively flat.  Hence, even if the peak in world oil production is only 
a few decades away, markets will have close to two decades to adjust to stagnating oil 
production growth before oil output begins to significantly decline.  The 95% confidence 
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interval places the peak in world oil production between the years 2029-2058, at annual 
production level of 37 to 63.3 billion bbl. 
 
Figure 1.6: World Oil Production Decreasing OPEC Market Share 
 
 
Figure 1.7 displays the mean price forecast in the case where OPEC’s share of the 
world oil market declines by 0.5% each year.  The mean price forecast in this case is little 
changed from the price forecast in the constant OPEC market share case.  Mean prices in 
the declining OPEC market share case are still expected to fall from their recent highs to 
a real price of around $26/bbl in 2000 constant dollars.  Mean prices in the declining 
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OPEC market share case rise sooner and slightly faster than in the constant OPEC market 
share case.  However, relative to the year-to-year volatility in real oil prices, this 
difference in mean oil prices would hardly be perceptible.  The primary reason for the 
similarity in the price forecasts, even with the strong difference in the production 
forecast, is the relatively stable production around the peak production year. 
 
Figure 1.7: Real Oil Prices Decreasing OPEC Market Share 
 
 
As discussed earlier, an examination of equation (1.14) shows that as cumulative 
discoveries rise over time the growth in the equilibrium number of non-OPEC entrants 
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into the oil industry,  Ne,  begins to slow.  The slowing growth in  Ne  first causes oil 
exploration to slow, and then causes oil development and production to slow.  With oil 
production slowing, equilibrium prices must rise to offset the increased demand for oil 
caused by world economic growth.  Rising oil prices also increase the value of drilled and 
undrilled wells, counteracting the effects of increasing cumulative discoveries and 
stabilizing the equilibrium number of entrants.  Hence, the equilibrium effects of rising 
prices cause world oil supply and demand to essentially flat line around the peak 
production year.  Thus, the mean price forecast for future world oil prices is little 
changed by the timing and level of oil output in the peak production year. 
 
1.3.6 World Oil Production and Price Forecast: Increasing OPEC Market Share 
 Figure 1.8 displays the forecast for world oil production over the next 100 years 
under the assumption that OPEC’s targeted market share increases by 0.5% each year.  
As in the previous two forecasts, the increasing OPEC market share and the structural 
model of non-OPEC oil production combine to make up the supply side of the world oil 
market.  World oil supply is equated to world oil demand by adjusting the equilibrium 
world oil price. 
As expected, with OPEC’s market share of world oil production increasing over 
time, the peak in world production occurs at a later date and at a higher level.  The mean 
forecast is for world oil production to peak in the year 2053 at an annual production level 
of just under 63.6 billion bbl.  As in the previous two forecasts, the oil production level 
around the peak production year is relatively flat.  Production in the increasing OPEC 
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market share scenario implies 26 years of production in excess of 60 billion bbl.  The 
95% confidence interval places the peak in world oil production between the years 2039-
2082, and at annual production level of 46.6 to 114.6 billion bbl. 
 
Figure 1.8: World Oil Production Increasing OPEC Market Share 
 
 
Figure 1.9 displays the mean price forecast in the case where OPEC’s share of the 
world oil market increases by 0.5% each year.  The mean price forecast in the case of 
increasing OPEC market share, is little changed from either the constant or decreasing 
OPEC market share forecast.  Prices are still expected to fall from their recent high to a 
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real price of around $22.5/bbl in 2000 constant dollars.  Mean prices in the declining 
OPEC market share case rise later and more slowly than in the baseline scenario but, as 
noted early, relative to the year-to-year price fluctuations, this difference is not 
economically significant.  In the case of increasing OPEC market share, mean prices are 
forecasted to level out towards the end of the century at a real price of $65/bbl in constant 
2000 dollars. 
 
Figure 1.9: Real Oil Prices Increasing OPEC Market Share 
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1.4 CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 This chapter presents a structural model of a competitive oil industry in which 
exploration, development and production are all explicitly modeled.  The model is then 
brought to the data on non-OPEC oil production, reserves and discoveries over the period 
1980-2006.  The model is estimated by simulated method of moments (SMM) and is 
found to match the moments of the data quite well.  In-sample simulations of the model 
also match the time series on non-OPEC production and reserves.  The structural model 
of non-OPEC oil production is then combined with different targeted market shares for 
OPEC oil production to make up the supply side of the world oil market.  The supply side 
of the world oil market is then brought into equilibrium with an estimated world demand 
for oil.  The resulting equilibrium world oil production and price levels are then 
simulated forward in numerous Monte Carlo simulations.  The Monte Carlo simulations 
enable the model’s forecasts to account for uncertainty about world output growth, future 
oil discoveries, and the model parameters. 
 In my model’s baseline case, in which OPEC continues to target its historic 
market share of 42% of the world oil market, I find that world oil production is likely to 
peak in the year 2047 at a yearly production level of 52 billion bbl.  This production 
forecast is similar to the EIA (2004) forecast that puts peak world oil production at 53.2 
billion bbl in the year 2037.  The main difference between the results in this chapter and 
the results from the EIA (2004) is the relative stability of world oil output around the 
peak production year.  In this model, the forces of increasing resource scarcity and rising 
world oil prices offset one another to produce nearly two decades of world oil production 
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at just over 50 billion bbl.  My results are at strict odds with studies using the 
methodology of Hubbert (1956) that predict impending world oil shortages.   
This chapter also forecasts that real oil prices are likely to fall below $30/bbl in 
constant 2000 dollars within the next decade.  However, real prices are likely to gradually 
rise after 2025 approaching $85/bbl by the end of the century.  To the best of my 
knowledge this is the first research piece to use a structural model of world oil production 
to forecast equilibrium world oil prices into the future.  Hence, the equilibrium prices in 
this model are determined by supply responses that are governed by the deep parameters 
of oil exploration, development and production rather than reduced form estimates based 
on historical relationships between prices and other variables.  
Two future avenues of research seem particularly appropriate.  The first is to 
extend the data on world oil reserves back in time.  The data in this chapter come from 
the BP Statistical Review (2007) and only contain reserve data back to 1980.  The EIA 
has reserve data for the US stretching back to 1899, and it is likely that longer time series 
for most of the world’s oil producers could be constructed on a country-by-country basis.  
Those national level statistics could then be summed up to the desired level of 
aggregation.  A second avenue of future research is to endogenize OPEC’s share of the 
world oil market.  However, modeling the fully specified non-cooperative game that 
OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers and consumers play with one another is a daunting 
task.  Nonetheless, a more sophisticated reduced form method of incorporating OPEC 
into the world oil market seems to be an attractive alternative and an important extension 
of the work presented here. 
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Since oil is likely the most important commodity to the world economy, forecasts 
of future of world oil production and prices have drawn rightful attention from policy 
makers and private individuals alike.  This chapter finds that while conventional oil 
production will likely peak sometime around the middle of this century, the peak in world 
oil production will be accompanied by nearly two decades of essential flat production.  
The equilibrium effects of gradually rising real oil prices result in slowing oil demand 
growth and increased incentives to explore, develop, and produce oil—thus preventing 
large declines in world oil production and dramatic oil price spikes.  This chapter finds 
that impending cataclysmic shortages in world oil production are, in essence, a near zero 
probability event. 
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Chapter 2: Do Ethnic Differences Inhibit the Provision of 
Environmental Public Goods? 
One of the most important services a government can render is the provision of 
public goods.  Due to its non-excludable and non-rival nature, environmental quality is 
often cited as a classic example of a public good.  If certain country-specific factors are 
impediments to good government, then across countries we would expect to find a strong 
correlation between those factors and public good provision.  Some suggest that ethnic 
divisions within a country are such a factor and can result in the poor provision of public 
goods.  This chapter finds that ethnic fractionalization, a measure of ethnic diversity, is 
significantly and positively correlated with country-level emissions of carbon dioxide, 
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC), methane, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide emissions, and 
hazardous waste.  Ethnic fractionalization is also significantly and positively correlated 
with higher local levels of ambient biochemical oxygen demand (BOD).  Moreover, the 
estimated coefficients suggest that ethnic fractionalization has a large degree of economic 
significance as well.  According to my point estimates, a one standard deviation increase 
in ethnic fractionalization increases country-level emissions by an average of 19%.  
Ethnic fractionalization appears to hamper significantly the provision of environmental 
quality, and it is therefore likely a substantial obstacle to the formation of well 
functioning institutions. 
 A growing literature has found that ethnic fractionalization inhibits economic 
growth and impedes the development of effective institutions. Empirical results on this 
subject have been compelling, but not without qualifications.  In the growth literature, 
papers such as La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) find that ethnic 
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fractionalization is inversely correlated with economic growth. However, these authors 
also find that other explanatory variables such as latitude and legal origin appear to be 
just as important as ethnic fractionalization in explaining cross-country growth rates. 
Alesina et al. (2003) finds that, under most specifications, controlling for latitude causes 
the coefficient on the ethnic fractionalization variable to lose its statistical significance.  
Alesina et al. (1999) find that, for US cities, shares of government spending are 
negatively correlated with ethnic fractionalization for education, roads, welfare, sewers 
and trash.  However, they also find that ethnic fractionalization is positively correlated 
with the share of spending devoted to police and health, both of which could be 
considered public goods as well.  This chapter extends this analysis to another public 
good, environmental quality. 
In the environmental justice literature, a number of empirical papers show that 
minority communities have higher levels of exposure to many common pollutants. 
Brooks and Sethi (1997) analyze US data on exposure to air toxics from 1988-1992 and 
find that  “a 1% greater proportion of this subpopulation [African Americans] in a zip 
code area is, on average, correlated with a value of exposure that is 2.8% larger”  (P. 
245).  Brajer and Hall (2005) find that in the South Coast Air Basin of California 
particulate pollution is positively correlated with the percentage of African American and 
Hispanic residents in the area. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to test the hypothesis that ethnic divisions impair 
public good provision by looking at the statistical relationship between measures of 
pollution and cross-country measures of ethnic fractionalization.  If ethnic 
fractionalization truly does impair public good provision, then controlling for other 
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variables should not cause bias in the estimation.  This chapter develops a theoretical 
model based on the work of Alesina et al. (1999) to motivate the statistical model and 
then conducts an empirical analysis for eight common pollutants.   
 This chapter makes three contributions to the literature.  First, it extends the 
ethnic fractionalization literature on growth, and certain public goods like education, to 
consider environmental quality.  In many of the specifications in Alesina et al. (2003), 
their ethnic fractionalization variable loses statistical significance once latitude and legal 
origin are included.  For some, this might call into question the importance that ethnic 
fractionalization plays in shaping institutions.  Here, however, even after controlling for 
latitude and legal origin, ethnic fractionalization still has a statistically and economically 
significant affect on all but one of the pollutants studied.   
The second contribution this chapter makes is to measure ethnic 
fractionalization’s effect on the actual level of public good provision.  Other empirical 
papers focus on ethnic fractionalization’s effect on the share of spending on public goods 
or on indexes of public good quality.  In contrast, the statistical work in this chapter uses 
either ambient pollution levels, which are exact measures of public good provision or 
emissions levels, which in most cases are near approximations of public good provision. 
The third contribution of this chapter is to extend the environmental justice 
literature to look at political economy explanations for the observed patterns in the data.  
The environmental justice literature has long recognized the statistical correlation in the 
US between pollution levels and the presence of minority populations.  This empirical 
finding has been interpreted by some to be evidence of environmental injustice.  Along 
similar lines, the growth and political economy literature has focused on ethnic conflict 
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and its effect on the quality of institutions.  Empirical papers in this literature find an 
inverse correlation between ethnic fractionalization and the provision of public goods like 
education.  Since this chapter uses measures of ethnic fractionalization at the country 
level, my empirical findings suggest that elevated pollution levels in ethnically diverse 
countries may not be due to targeted environmental injustice, but may instead be the 
result of an inability to reach a consensus on the shape and form of public good 
provision. 
This chapter finds that ethnic fractionalization is positively correlated with higher 
emissions of carbon dioxide, CFCs, methane, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and 
ambient levels of biochemical oxygen demand.  Ethnic fractionalization has a statistically 
insignificant effect on nitrogen oxide emissions even though the unconditional correlation 
is quite large.  Under a number of specifications coefficients on latitude and legal origin 
are statistically significant.  However, the sign of these coefficients switch back and forth 
depending on the pollutant making it difficult to argue that the relationship is not 
spurious.  In addition, unlike the results in the growth literature, controlling for latitude 
and legal origin has almost no impact on ethnic fractionalization’s estimated economic or 
statistical significance. 
This chapter is organized as follows.  The Section 2.1 presents a theoretical model 
to motivate the statistical analysis.  Section 2.2 presents the statistical model, the data and 
equation structures.  Section 2.3 presents the main results of the chapter by looking at the 
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and country-level pollution emissions.  
Section 2.4 performs a robustness check of the results in Section 2.3 by looking at 
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ambient environmental quality from the local level.  Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the 
chapter. 
2.1 THEORETICAL MODEL 
 The model presented here is a close variant of the model presented in Alesina et 
al. (1999).  The model consists of  J  countries, each with a continuum of citizens from 0 
to 1.  The citizens in each country have to decide on the level of public good provision,  
g,  and the type of public good provision,  t.  The type of public good provision,  t,  is 
assumed to lie on a one dimensional ideological line.  Decisions in each country are made 









where  in country  j,  uij  is the utility of citizen  i,  cj  is private consumption,  gj  is the 
level of public good provision,  tj  is the type of public good currently provided in country  
j,  and  tij  is the type of public good preferred by individual  i.  The parameter  α  is 
constrained to take on values  such that  )1,0(∈α .  The bounds on  α  indicate that the 
marginal utility of the public good is decreasing. 
 Private consumption in country  j  is determined by the following budget 
constraint: 
(2.2) jjj yc τ−= , 
where  yj  is the income endowment common to all individuals in country  j  and  τj  is the 
lump sum tax common to all individuals in country  j.  The government in country  j  
must run a balanced budget.  Hence, the government budget constraint is the following: 
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(2.3) jjj gXp )(=τ , 
where )( jXp  is the cost of providing one unit of the public good, and  Xj  is a vector of 
variables.  The variables that compose the vector  Xj  are common to all countries; 
however, the values of those variables are not.  The function  p  converts the vector  Xj  
into a country-specific price of public good provision that is known to all citizens. 
If individual  i  in country  j  were allowed to choose the level of public good 
provision taking  tj  as given, then the following equation would describe their optimal 
choice:  
(2.4) )1/(1* )](/|)|1[( α−−−= jijjij Xpttg . 
To derive equation (2.4) substitute equations (2.3) and (2.2) into equation (2.1), take the 
derivative of equation (2.1) with respect to  gj,  set it equal to zero, and then solve for 
individual  i’s  preferred level of public good provision,  gij.  Following Alesina et al. 
(1999), it is assumed that citizens of country  j  first vote on the size of the public good,  
gj,  and then on the type of the public good,  tj.  In the case of providing a public good 
like environmental quality, the decision over  tj  will most likely be a question about 
abatement.  Citizens are likely to disagree over what abatement technologies to use and 
most importantly the division of total abatement among individuals.  Given the two-stage 
nature of the voting process, citizen  i  knows that when he or she votes on the size of the 
public good, the type of the public good will be decided by the median voter in the 
second stage of the voting process. 
Let us now define ||ˆ ij
m
jij ttd −= .  Here, ijd̂  is the distance between the type of 
public good preferred by citizen  i  in country  j,  tij,  and the type of public good 
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preferred by the median voter in stage two of the voting process, mjt .  In equilibrium, the 
size of the public good,  gj,  is determined in stage one of the voting process by the 
median distance from the median voter in stage two.  Hence, by defining mjd  as the 
median of ijd̂  and inserting it into equation (2.3) the following equilibrium size of the 
public good is derived: 




j Xpdg . 
As can be seen from equation (2.5), the equilibrium size of public good provision in 
country  j  is just a function of variables specific to that country.  Equation (2.5) also 
implies that the size of the public good is decreasing in  mjd . 
Define  tj(N)  as the type of public good provision preferred by the  N
th  percentile 
of the distribution of  tij.  I now introduce the notion of a strict, median-preserving spread 
in the distribution of  tij.  The distribution of  tik  represents a strict, median-preserving 
spread of the distribution of  tij  if the following are true: (i)  tj(50) = tk(50),  and (ii) 
|)()50(||)()50(| NttNtt kkjj −<−  for all  N  not equal to 50. 
 
Proposition 1.  If the distribution of  tik  is a strict median preserving spread of the 




j gg > . 
 
Proof.  Given the definition of  tj(N),  the type of public good provision preferred 
by the median voter in country  j  is  tj(50).  Hence, ijd̂  is equal to |)()50(| Ntt jj −  when  
N  is equal to the percentile corresponding to agent  i’s  location in the distribution of  tij.  
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By definition of a strict, median-preserving spread |)()50(||)()50(| NttNtt kkjj −<−  for 
all  N  not equal to 50.  Thus, it must be the case that mk
m
j dd < , since 
m
jd  and 
m
kd  are just 




j gg >  since from equation (2.5) 
e
jg  is clearly decreasing in  
m




j dd < . 
 
From the above proposition it is clear that a strict, median-preserving-spread of 
the distribution of  tij  results in a smaller size of public good provision.  If increasing 
ethnic fractionalization causes a strict, median-preserving spread in the preferred types of 
public good provision, then countries with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization will 
have a level public good provision that is lower in size than countries with less ethnic 
fractionalization.  Hence, it is the assumption that ethnic fractionalization does in fact 
produce a spread in the distribution of  tij  that provides the theoretical foundation for an 
inverse relationship between ethnic fractionalization and country level public good 
provision.  Empirical tests are now needed to determine if such relationship exists in the 
data. 
 
2.2 STATISTICAL MODEL 
 The previous section uses a theory model to derive equation (2.5), which relates 
the size of public good provision in country  j  to the median distance from the type of 
public good preferred by the median voter, mjd , and the price of public good provision,  











j Xpdg αα −− −−= . 
In theory, with perfect knowledge of each country’s  )( jXp   and  
m
jd , equation (2.6) 
could be directly estimated.  Unfortunately, such perfect knowledge is not available and 
thus reduced form modeling assumptions are needed in order to estimate the relationship 
between public good provision and other explanatory variables.  
 
2.2.1 Equation Structure 
In order to proceed with the statistical analysis of this chapter, three modeling 
assumptions have been made.  First, it is assumed that ethnic fractionalization’s affect on 
m
jd , through its affect on the distribution of  tij,  can be approximated by the following 
reduced form relationship: 
(2.7) j
m
j ethfracd 0)1ln( γ=− . 
Second,  p  is assumed to be multiplicative function of the vector of variables  Xj 
such that NNjjjj xxxXp
γγγ −−− ⋅⋅⋅= ...)( 21 21 and Nγγγ ,...,, 21  can be either positive or negative 
parameters.  From this second assumption it is easy to show the following: 
(2.8) )ln(...)ln()ln())(ln( 2211 NjNjjj xxxXp γγγ −−−−= . 
And third, the vector of variables,  Xj, that influence the size of the public good 
are assumed to be GDP, GDP squared, the percentage of GDP that comes from 
manufacturing, the percentage of GDP that comes from agriculture, population density, 
land area, year, latitude, and legal origin.  Substituting these three modeling assumptions 






















where )1/( αγβ −= kk , for  8,...,0=k   and where 
e
jg  is the public good provision in 
country  j,  gdpj  is per capita gross domestic product in country  j,  popdenj  is the 
population density in country  j,  landj  is the land area of country  j,  agrcltj  is the 
percentage of  gdpj  that comes from agriculture,  manfactj  is the percentage of  gdpj  that 
comes from manufacturing,    latj  is the latitude of country  j,  ethfracj  is the level of 
ethnic fractionalization in country  j,  t  is the year of the observation,  D  is a vector of 
coefficients, and  legalj  is a matrix of dummy variables that indicate whether country  j  
is of French, German, Socialist or Scandinavian legal origin.  The English legal origin 
dummy variable has been left out in order to accommodate the constant term  C.  Thus all 
of the legal origin coefficients should be interpreted relative to the baseline of being of 
English legal origin.   
 The motivation for the equation structure comes from two sources.  First, in order 
to be consistent with prior literature much of the specification has been chosen to match 
that of La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003).  Specifically the following 
variables were all included as regressors in their empirical work: log per capita GDP, log 
per capita GDP squared, latitude, legal origin and ethnic fractionalization.  The inclusion 
of these variables allows us to compare their empirical work with my analysis of 
environmental public good determination in order to better understand the relative 
importance of ethnic fractionalization, latitude and legal origin.   
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Second, according to the theory outlined in Section 2.1, an important determinant 
of ambient environmental quality is the function )( jXp .  This function is meant to 
generically capture all of the costs of providing environmental amenities in a particular 
country.  In order to control for cross-country heterogeneity in the costs of providing 
environmental amenities, I include the variables of  agrcltj,  manfactj,  landj  and  t.  
While a number of variables are likely to influence the costs and benefits of 
environmental public good provision, it is of particular importance to control for the 
composition of GDP and the physical size of the country in which pollution can attenuate 
over.  It is also important to control for technological advancements over time and hence, 
these variables are included in the analysis here. 
The dependent variable in equation (2.9) is the log level of environmental quality.  
Unfortunately, the level of environmental quality provided in each country is not known.  
In practice, environmental quality is often approximated by measures of emissions or by 
pollutant levels per volume of air or water.  Thus due to data limitation equation (2.9) 
cannot be estimated.  Instead, most of the estimated equations take per capita emission 
levels as the dependent variable in place of the unknown level environmental quality.  In 
addition, emissions data set used in this chapter covers a number of years as well as 




















where  ejt  is the level of per capita emissions in country  j  in year  t. 
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2.2.2 The Data 
 A variety of sources were employed in order to construct the data set used in this 
chapter.  Real gross domestic product data is from the 2005 World Bank Development 
Indicators.  This data set covers the years 1960-2003 and the units are measured in 
constant 2000 US dollars.  Data on the percentage of real GDP that comes from 
manufacturing and agriculture are from the 2002 World Bank Development Indicators 
(WBDI) and covers the years 1960-2000.  Population density data is from World 
Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision provided by the United Nations Population 
Division/Department of Economics and Social Affairs (UNDESA).  Population density is 
measured by people per square kilometer and cover the years 1961-2002.  Land area data 
is from FAO STAT 2004 provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN 
and covers the years 1961-2002.  Country latitude data is from the 2006 CIA World 
Factbook and legal origin data is from La Porta et al. (1999). 
The measures of country-level ethnic fractionalization come from Alesina et al. 
(2003).  The measures Alesina et al. (2003) use capture the probability that two randomly 
selected people from country  j  belong to the same ethnic group.  Ethnic fractionalization 







where  sij  is the percentage of the population of country  j  that is of ethnicity  i.  Thus a 
country with perfect ethnic homogeneity has an  ethfrac  equal to zero and a country with 
perfect ethnic heterogeneity has an  ethfrac  equal to one. 
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Table 2.1: Cross-Country Summary Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LHS Variables:
     CO 2 2409 3.0888 4.6906 0.005 35.7526
     CO 265 0.2646 0.352 0.0022 2.8958
     CH 4 611 0.0646 0.0663 0.0047 0.5557
     CFC 1421 0.0956 0.4513 0 6.8125
     BOD 1371 5.6952 4.7402 0.0097 27.2457
     SO 2 265 0.0253 0.0446 0.0004 0.5256
     NO 2 612 0.0031 0.0046 0.000004 0.0664
Hazardous Waste 115 0.0001 0.0001 1.84E-05 0.0011
RHS Variables:
     GDP 2677 4063.509 6757.567 86.08805 47746.07
     Popden 2677 145.7977 480.3403 1.2354 6584.328
     Land 2677 75500.9 172076.8 18 932745
     Agriclt 2677 0.2048 0.1492 0.0014 0.7176
     Manfact 2677 0.1509 0.078 0.0019 0.4354
     Ethfrac 2677 0.4521 0.2636 0 0.9302
     Lat 2677 0.2393 0.1725 0 0.7222
Legal Origin:
     English 2677 0.3874 0.4872 0 1
     French 2677 0.4733 0.4994 0 1
     German 2677 0.0202 0.1406 0 1
     Scand 2677 0.0269 0.1618 0 1
     Socialist 2677 0.0923 0.2895 0 1
Summary statistics for RHS variables calculated over all observations for which some 
emissions data are available.
GDP and emissions data all in per capita units.
 
 
The country level data described above was then matched with country level 
emissions data.  Data on carbon dioxide emissions, measured in metric tons per person, is 
from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and UNDESA and 
covers the years 1980-2001.  BOD emissions data, measured in kilograms per day, is 
from the 2002 WBDI and covers the years 1980-1999.  Carbon monoxide and sulfur 
dioxide emissions data, measured in thousands of metric tons, is from the Emission 
Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR 3.2) and covers the years 1990 and 
1995.  Methane and nitrogen dioxide data, measured in thousands of metric tons, is from 
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EDGAR 3.2 and covers the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995.  CFCs 
emissions data, measured in ozone depleting potential metric tons, is from the UN 
Environment Program Ozone Secretariat and covers the years 1986 and 1989-2003.  
Hazardous waste emissions data, measured in thousands of tons, is from the 2004 OECD 
Environmental Data Compendium and covers the years 1990-2002. 
The dependent variable for the majority of the estimated equations is country-
level per capita emissions.  For pollutants such as carbon monoxide, the correlations 
between country-level emissions and country-level ambient air quality are likely to be 
high-- due to the limited role of transboundary spillovers. For pollutants such as sulfur 
dioxide, however, the divergence between country-level emissions and country-level 
ambient air quality is country-specific. In the US, for instance, the majority of sulfur 
dioxide released in the Rust Belt of the US lands on cities in the northeastern US.  Thus 
for the US, sulfur dioxide emissions are a close approximation of ambient environmental 
quality.  However, in Europe transboundary sulfur dioxide spillovers are significant and 
play an important role in determining environmental quality.  Unfortunately, data that 
matches sulfur dioxide emission in one country to acid rainfall in another is limited to a 
small number of countries.  Thus, in order to cover a larger sample of countries, most of 
the analysis in this chapter uses emissions data. 
The majority of the statistical work in this chapter is done at the national level, but 
some statistical analysis is carried out at the local level as a robustness check.  For the 
empirical work done at the local level, I use a data set kindly provided to me by Hilary 
Sigman.  Her data set contains information, on among other things, ambient water quality 
as measured by levels of biochemical oxygen demand in a number of rivers around the 
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world and was the basis for her 2004 paper.  This data set is discussed in more detail in 
Section 2.4 of the chapter when the robustness check is preformed.   
 
2.3 THE RESULTS 
 Before discussing the estimated coefficients from the fully specified model in 
equation (2.10), it important to examine the unconditional correlations between ethnic 
fractionalization and emissions.  Strong unconditional correlations reduce the likelihood 
that economically and statistically significant  ethfrac  coefficient estimates are the result 
of model specification bias in equation (2.10). 
 
2.3.1 Unconditional Correlations 
 Figure 2.1 plots each country’s emissions per unit of output against that country’s 
level of ethnic fractionalization.  Listed at the top of each graph is the unconditional 
correlation between ethnic fractionalization and emissions per unit of output. 
A pronounced uptrend is evident in almost all of the scatter plots.  Country level 
emissions per unit of output fan out and tend to increase as country level ethnic 
fractionalization increases.  Excluding carbon dioxide and CFCs, the unconditional 
correlations between ethnic fractionalization and emissions per unit of output are all quite 
high: ranging from 0.1375 for BOD to 0.4997 for carbon monoxide.  The strong 
unconditional correlation between ethnic fractionalization and emissions per unit of 
output make it likely that ethnic fractionalization plays some roll in public good 
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provision.  However, in order to quantify ethnic fractionalization’s effect on emissions 
and ensure that the unconditional correlations are robust to multiple controls, regression 
analysis is needed. 
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2.3.2 Regression Results 
In the Table 2.2 below, each row represents a different estimated equation.  The 
estimated equations are indexed by the particular pollutant that is studied, and that 
pollutant appears in the first column of Table 2.2. The remaining columns show the 
estimated coefficients on the legal-origin dummy variables, latitude, and ethnic 
fractionalization. The standard errors appear in parentheses.  For brevity, the estimated 
coefficients for the other regressors discussed in Section 2.1 are not reported here in 
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Table 2.2, but they are available upon request.  All of the coefficients in Table 2.2 are 
estimated using ordinary least squares. 
 
Table 2.2: Determinants of Cross-Country Emissions 
Pollutant French German Scand Socialist Latitude Ethfrac R
2
Obs.
CO 2 -0.287*** -0.342*** -0.297** 0.986*** 0.801*** 0.652*** 0.84 2409
(0.031) (0.106) (0.127) (0.065) (0.132) (0.069)
BOD -0.430*** -0.345*** 0.223** 0.242*** 0.468*** -0.066 0.75 1371
(.034) (0.090) (0.088) (0.075) (0.133) (0.081)
CH 4 -0.235*** -0.463*** -0.770*** 0.202* -0.273 0.230** 0.58 611
(0.045) (0.165) (0.151) (0.114) (0.198) (0.106)
CO -0.044 -0.064 -0.211 0.048 -1.866*** 0.660*** 0.59 265
(0.090) (0.274) (0.276) (0.181) (0.375) (0.201)
NO 2 -0.061 -0.698*** -0.513*** -0.618*** 0.872*** -0.0555 0.49 612
(0.059) (0.216) (0.197) (0.149) (0.257) (0.139)
SO 2 -0.106 -0.326 -0.374 0.613*** 1.334*** 1.038*** 0.69 265
(0.110) (0.336) (0.338) (0.221) (0.460) (0.247)
CFC 0.367*** -0.026 -1.321*** -0.467** 0.746 1.051*** 0.29 1421
(0.122) (0.438) (0.500) (0.238) (0.522) (0.273)
Hazardous 0.228 0.312 0.012 1.228*** 1.709 2.538*** 0.41 115
Waste (0.257) (0.252) (0.360) (0.389) (1.198) (0.639)
*** significant at 1%, **  significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
 
As can be seen from Table 2.2, ethnic fractionalization is a statistically significant 
explanatory variable for 6 out of the 8 pollutants studied.  The point estimates also 
indicate that the effect of ethnic fractionalization on pollution levels has substantial 
practical significance as well.  Looking at the estimated equation for sulfur dioxide, the 
point estimate of 1.038 implies that an increase in ethnic fractionalization from perfect 
homogeneity to perfect heterogeneity would result in a 182% increase in sulfur dioxide 
emissions.  Likewise, the other coefficients imply an increase in carbon dioxide 
emissions of 92%, an increase in methane of 26%, an increase in carbon monoxide of 
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93%, an increase in CFCs of 186%, and an increase in hazardous waster of 1165%.  The 
average size of the ethnic fractionalization coefficient is 0.756.  This implies that for a 
one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization country level emissions can be 
expected to rise by over 22% holding all else equal. 
 Ethnic fractionalization does not have a statistically significant effect on country 
level emissions of biochemical oxygen demand or nitrous oxide.  The negative point 
estimates for the biochemical oxygen demand and nitrous oxide regressions may be 
evidence that ethnic fractionalization does not impair the provision of public goods such 
as environmental quality.  However, in both cases the point estimates are very close to 
zero, and thus a more reasonable interpretation is that ethnic fractionalization has little or 
no influence on national level emissions of biochemical oxygen demand and nitrous 
oxide.  I return to the question of ethnic fractionalization’s effect on biochemical oxygen 
demand in the robustness analysis when I examine the determinants of local level 
environmental quality. 
 The effects of other regressors on the provision of environmental quality are 
inconsistent and, in a number of cases, contrary to expectation based on earlier results in 
the literature.  For instance, La Porta et al. (2003) find that countries with French or 
Socialist legal origins have less public good provision than countries with English legal 
origin.  However, the results in Table 2.2 imply that being of French legal origin 
significantly reduces the emissions of carbon dioxide, biochemical oxygen demand, and 
methane.  Likewise being of Socialist legal origin significantly reduces the emissions of 
nitrous oxide and CFCs. 
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 Others in the literature have suggested that geography is the main impediment to 
forming well-functioning institutions.  A number of papers find that being near the 
equator is significantly correlated with poor public good provision.  If geographic factors 
such as latitude truly inhibit public good provision, then we would expect to find a 
negative relationship between latitude and pollution emissions.  For 1of the 8 pollutants 
studied, latitude does have a negative and significant effect on emissions.  However, 
latitude has a positive and statistically significant effect on the emissions of carbon 
dioxide, biochemical oxygen demand, nitrous oxide, and sulfur dioxide.  Indicating that 
for these pollutants, countries near the equator actually do a better job of providing 
environmental quality than countries away from the equator. 
 
2.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 While the results in Table 2.2 provide strong evidence that ethnic fractionalization 
does inhibit the provision of environmental quality, one could argue that these results are 
not robust at the local level.  Valuable information could be lost by aggregating data at 
the national level.  In the statistical analysis above, it was implicitly assumed that each 
country’s natural absorption of emitted pollutants was only a function of land size.  While 
this may not be the case, other determinates of natural absorption are unlikely to be 
correlated with ethnic fractionalization.  So while it is possible that other factors omitted 
from my regression analysis could affect the natural attenuation abilities of a country’s 
environment, I do not believe that this omission biases the estimates of the ethnic 
fractionalization coefficients. 
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 In order to ensure that the use of national aggregates is not biasing my results, I 
perform a robustness check by analyzing environmental quality at the local level.  While 
it is likely that countries of equal land size have similar rates of absorption of air 
pollution, they may not have similar rates for water pollution.  Data on national level 
emissions of biochemical oxygen demand may not map well into actual ambient water 
quality because we do not know whether those emissions are being released into one river 
or many rivers.  Nor do we know the attenuation abilities of those rivers.  For instance, 
larger, faster flowing rivers can accommodate much more pollution than small, slow 
moving rivers.  In this section I control for differences in attenuation abilities, and then 
analyze the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and local-level ambient water 
quality.  This enables me to make sure that the results in Section 2.3 are not biased by 
cross-country differences in natural attenuation abilities,  
 
2.4.1 Data 
 The data I use to perform the robustness check come from Sigman (2004).  Her 
data set has information on ambient water quality from the United Nations Nations' 
Global Environmental Monitoring System Water Quality Monitoring Project 
(GEMS/Water).  Ambient water quality is measured by the mean level of biochemical 
oxygen demand, and pollution measurements are taken at 247 different GEMS 
monitoring stations around the world.  Sigman’s data set also has information on each 
river’s rate of flow, upstream population, and deoxygenation rate.  In addition to these 
variables she also has information on the political rights, trading practices and general 
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openness of the countries in which the pollution observation have been taken.  Her data 
also contain information on the where the pollution measurements are taken relative to 
international borders, to control for possible pollution spillover effects.  Sigman (2002) 
finds evidence that international pollution spillovers impair ambient water quality, and 
Sigman (2004) finds that bilateral trade helps to mitigate these effects. 
 
2.4.2 Results 
In Table 2.3 below, I take the specification of Sigman (2004) and add to it the 
legal-origin dummy variables, latitude, and ethnic fractionalization variables used in 
Section 2.3.  The goal of this exercise is to make sure that the results from Section 2.3 are 
robust to controlling for a variety of other issues omitted from the previous analysis such 
as the effect of international spillovers and differences in local-level environmental 
absorption.  The equations in Table 2.2 are estimated using ordinary least squares, and 
the standard errors are robust to clustering at the station level. 
Looking at Table 2.3, it is clear that ethnic fractionalization plays a large role in 
the provision of environmental quality.  The point estimate of 0.997 suggest that an 
increase in ethnic fractionalization from perfect ethnic homogeneity to perfect ethnic 
heterogeneity would increase pollution levels 171%, an estimate that is significant at the 
five percent level.  The results for other possible determinants of public good provision 
are mixed. 
The estimated coefficient on the latitude variable once again contains the wrong 
sign and is not statistically different from zero at any standard level.  The coefficients on 
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the Scandinavian and Socialist legal-origin dummy variables are both statistically 
significant at the ten percent level, and the French legal-origin variable is statistically 
significant at the five percent level.  As was shown in Section 2.3, however,  these 
dummy variable are often statistically significant with negative estimated coefficients, 
which indicates that being of legal origin other than English actual improves 
environmental quality. 
 
Table 2.3: Determinants of Local-Level Ambient Water Quality 
Dependent Variable: Ambient Log(BOD) Coef. Std. Err
Downstream station 0.664* 0.358
Log(Trade intensity) if downstream station -0.09* 0.0479
Upstream station 0.7003 0.484
Log(Trade intensity) if upstream station -0.184 0.144
Border station -0.716* 0.429
Log(Trade intensity) if border station 0.243** 0.122
Log(Upstream population) 0.056** 0.026
Own country per capita GDP 0.013 0.056
Own country per capita GDP
2
-0.0014 0.0021
Own country Log(Other openness) 0.133 0.1248
Own country Log(Political rights) -0.485*** 0.135
Log(River flow) -0.109** 0.039
River flow missing -0.267 0.469
River deoxygenation rate 1.397 0.883
Year 0.0213** 0.001
French legal origin 0.459** 0.169
German legal origin 0.089 0.227
Scandinavian legal origin 0.749* 0.422
Socialist legal origin 0.501* 0.275
Latitude 0.523 0.769
Ethnic fractionalization 0.997** 0.476
Constant 1.584 0.74
R – squared 0.25
Number of observations 1387
*** significant at 1%, **  significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  
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Thus, it is difficult to interpret how legal origin affects public good provision.  
Overall, as evidenced by the results in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, ethnic fractionalization is 
consistently and significantly correlated with higher levels of emissions and lowers levels 
of ambient environmental quality.  The logical interpretation of these results is that ethnic 
fractionalization inhibits the formation of good institutions, and thus the provision of 
public goods such as environmental quality suffers. 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 A large literature has documented the importance of quality institutions.  What 
enables some countries and not others to develop strong, stable institutions has been a 
topic of hot debate.  A growing literature has found evidence that ethnic fractionalization 
could play an important role in the development of quality institutions.  This chapter adds 
to that literature by documenting the fact that ethnic fractionalization is significantly 
correlated with the poor provision of environmental quality.  Ethnic fractionalization has 
an adverse impact on the emissions of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, total greenhouse 
gases, CFCs, methyl bromide, sulfur dioxide, methane and ambient levels biochemical 
oxygen demand.  Other suggested determinants of public good provision such as legal 
origin and latitude have an inconsistent effect on environmental quality. 
It is difficult to explain the consistent statistically significant relationship between 
ethnic fractionalization and environmental quality without coming to the conclusion that 
ethnic fractionalization is having an adverse impact on institutional quality.  Therefore I 
believe that an important area of future research is to understand more about the ways in 
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which ethnic fractionalization effects institutional development.  The results of this 
chapter and others make a strong case that ethnic strife is a likely culprit in poor 
institutional outcomes. 
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Chapter 3: Divergence Followed By Convergence: The Propagation of 
Arrest Rates in Victimless Crimes 
Using national data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Statistics and the US Census, 
a comparison of the per capita arrest rates for victimless crimes show not only that these 
rates differ across racial lines, but that the ratios of black to white per capita arrests, “B-
W ratio,” follow a distinct, hump-shaped time series. 
 




For drug and prostitution arrests, this series is displayed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  
The hump-shaped pattern in the B-W ratio for drug offenses in Figure 3.1 peaks first in 
1955, and then again in the post Vietnam era.  An identical hump-shaped pattern in the B-
W ratio for prostitution offenses is also seen in Figure 3.2, but peaking in 1969.  These 
figures show three distinct hump-shaped patterns in the B-W ratio for drug and 
prostitution offenses and are unlikely to be the result of random fluctuations. 
 




In general, the number of drug and prostitution arrests per capita is rising over 
time.  This fact is consistent with, and likely caused by, rising law enforcement 
expenditures.  However, the pronounced humped shaped pattern in the B-W ratio for both 
the drug and prostitution offenses is difficult to explain.  The peak in the B-W ratio for 
drug offenses occurs 14 years before the peak in the B-W ratio for prostitution offenses 
and 10 years before the number drug arrests per capita start rapidly rising with the war on 
drugs.  Likewise, the peak in the B-W ratio for prostitution offenses does not correspond 
to any large changes in total prostitution arrests per capita.  In 1969, the cumulative 
growth rate in prostitution arrests per capita was 9.1%, very close to the average growth 
rate for the 1960s of 6.1%.  Thus it is hard to argue that the hump-shaped pattern in the 
B-W ratio is somehow related to an exogenous shock to law enforcement expenditures or 
focus. 
The hump-shaped pattern in the two B-W ratios rises and falls in a very steady 
and persistent pattern.  Thus it is difficult to understand the peaks in the B-W ratios as 
random shocks to number of black American arrested relative to white American.  The 
time series of both the prostitution and drug B-W ratios are extremely persistent.  Using 
an augmented Dickey Fuller test we cannot reject the presence of a unit root at any 
standard level of significance.  However, both time series clearly look to be returning to 
their initial values.  The obvious hump-shaped pattern in the arrest ratios combined with 
their strong statistical persistence make a compelling case against the argument that 
random shocks to the black arrest rate could account of the peak in the B-W ratios. 
One such underlying process that could explain the hump-shaped pattern in the B-
W ratios is increasing and then decreasing levels of racism among law enforcement.  
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However, two facts are strictly at odds with this conjecture.  First, as noted before, the 
peak in the B-W ratio for drug offenses occurs 14 years prior to the peak in the B-W ratio 
for prostitution offenses.  It is highly unlikely that racism among drug enforcement 
officers rose and then fell 14 years before such an increase and then decrease occurred for 
prostitution enforcement officers. 
This chapter addresses the question of whether it is possible that a peak in the B-
W ratio is the result of rational law enforcement behavior in a world in which the 
underlying rate of criminal behavior is equal across race and stationary in time.  We 
present a model to explain Figures 3.1 and 3.2 and then discuss the parameters and 
variables that are necessary for the emergence of the hump-shaped pattern.  The 
underlying forces driving the model and the relevant policy implications are discussed as 
well. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.1 discusses the data.  
Section 3.2 presents our model and compares it to the data.  Section 3.3 estimates our 
model for the static case and Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.1 DATA 
The time series of the white population in the United States between 1933 and 
2004 is derived using a combination of data collection and interpolation.  From 1933-
1979, the total white population is taken from the US Bureau of the Census.  In the years 
where estimates are only available by age, all ages were summed.  From 1980-1999 the 
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US Bureau of the Census only has records of the total white population for 1980, 1990 
and 2000.  We interpolate the population estimates between these years using the formula 
(3.1) 10/,10,,, )/(
t
iiiti poppoppoppop ττττ ++ = , 




nnt .  For 2000-2004, we return to the 
recorded total white population recorded by the US Bureau of the Census. 
Since the total black population of the United States is not a category recorded by 
the US Bureau of the Census prior to 1960, the methodology for determining the black 
population is slightly different than for the white population.  From 1933-1959 we use the 
total non-white population as recorded by the US Bureau of the Census.  Then from 
1960-1979 we use the total black population recorded by the US Bureau of the Census.  
From 1980-1999, the US Bureau of the Census only has records of the total black 
population for 1980, 1990 and 2000.  We interpolate the population estimates between 
these years using equation (3.1).  For 2000-2004, we again use the recorded total black 
population recorded by the US Bureau of the Census. 
Arrest rates from 1933-2004 are recorded by the FBI in the Uniform Crime 
Statistics.  We record data for the total number of drug arrests by race, recorded as Drug 
Abuse Violations, and prostitution arrests by race, listed as Prostitution and 
Commercialized Vice.  From 1952-1959, data is only recorded in cities with total 
population of over 2,500.  In 1960-1961, city and rural data are given separately and we 
use the sum.  In 1962, only city data are given.  Since less than five percent of arrests are 
attributed to rural areas in 1960 and 1961, we do not modify the “city-only” data from the 
Uniform Crime Reports for the years that full data are not available.  In 1933 the closest 
category to prostitution is “sex offenses (excluding rape).” To avoid a potential 
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discrepancy resulting from this, we make 1934 the first year of our prostitution data 
series. 
For drug and prostitution offenses, we divide the number of white arrests by the 
total white population and the number of black arrests by the total black population to 
obtain four time series of arrest rates.  Further, we obtain the B-W ratio for drug and 
prostitution offenses by dividing the black arrest rate by the white arrest rate for each 
offense. 
Viewing the B-W ratio for drug offenses, it is seen that in 1933 the ratio began at 
1.49 before increasing to a peak of 15.26 in 1955.  After 1955 the B-W ratio for drug 
offense declines rapidly and levels off in the mid 1970s at value slightly over 2.  
However, starting in the late1970s the humped shaped pattern in the B-W ratio for drug 
offenses repeats itself, though in this case reaching a peak of only 4.96 in 1989.  Post 
1989 the B-W ratio for drug offenses then gradually declines to just over 3 in the year 
2004. 
The total number of drug arrests over the period 1933-2004 also displays some 
interesting features.  Total arrests per capita rise over the entire sample 1933-2004 with 
an average annual cumulative growth rate of 7.56%.  However, the growth in arrests per 
capita is far from constant.  Over the period 1933-1964 the mean growth rate is 5.6% and 
over the period 1976-2004 the mean growth rate is 2.4%.  While in the intermediate 
period 1965-1975 the mean growth rate is 26.4% and corresponds to the beginning of the 
war on drugs. 
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Figure 3.3: Per Capita Drug Arrests 1933-1969 
 
 
The B-W ratio for prostitution offenses contains the same hump-shaped pattern as 
the B-W ratio for drug offenses.  The B-W ratio for prostitution offenses begins in 1934 
at a value of 3.2 and increases to a maximum value of 15.94 in 1969.  The B-W ratio for 
prostitution offenses then declines to a value of 4.4 in 2004.  Total prostitution arrests per 
capita steadily increase until 1983 and then decline over the rest of the sample.  In 1983, 
0.054% of the population was arrested for prostitution whereas in 2004 and 1934 the 
percent of the population arrested was 0.022% and 0.004% respectively. 
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Figure 3.4: Per Capita Drug Arrests 1970-2004 
 
 
For all peaks in the B-W ratio, the fall is precipitated by an increase in the white 
arrest rate, and it is only after the ratio has begun to fall that we see a reduction in the 
black arrest rate.  In other words, law enforcement officers are still arresting an increasing 
percentage of the black population for a number of years after the peak in the B-W ratios 
and further evidence that rising and then falling racism towards black Americans cannot 
explain the hump-shaped pattern seen in the data.  This phenomenon can be clearly seen 
in Figures 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 below. 
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Figure 3.5: Per Capita Prostitution Arrests 1934-2004 
 
 
3.2 THE MODEL 
Based upon the findings of the previous literature, our model has six assumptions.  
First, communities are separated by race.  Manning (2004) cites police as classifying 
drugs as “black” or “white” drugs according to the racial group that primarily uses them.  
Additionally, he documents that black officers are primarily used to obtain black 
informants, while white offers are used to obtain white informants.  Second, the arrest 
rate in a community is an increasing function of informants per capita and law 
enforcement budget per capita in that community.  William et al (1979) details the role of 
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informants in generating arrests.  They also make note of binding budget constraints as 
being the primary limitation in arrest rates.  Third, the objective of law enforcement is to 
maximize the present discounted number of total arrests.  Kansas City Police Chief 
Joseph McNamara (2001) states that promotions are based on making “good arrests” and 
that on a yearly basis “cops are pressured to fulfill a drug arrest quota.”  From William et 
al (1979) we know that there is no written objective for law enforcement units in 
reference to drug enforcement.  We therefore use this extension of the suggestions set 
forth in  Shoup (1964) about police maximization. 
Fourth, arrest rates do not vary sufficiently to affect criminal behavior.  In 
contradiction to the assumptions of Becker (1968), Levitt (2002) showed that in a closed, 
artificial environment that when the increase in the probability of detection is sufficiently 
small, there is no change in law-violating behavior.  Testing this result for drug offenders, 
we find the correlation between the change in the arrest rate and the change in drug usage 
is not statistically different from zero.7  Fifth, informants in period  t  +  1  are a fixed 
percentage of arrestees in period  t .  William et al (1979) finds that informants are 
compiled from those arrests on lesser charges.  Since data does not exist on the number 
and race of informants over the time range we examine, we are forced to infer the number 
of informants based upon prior arrests.  A fixed fraction was chosen as it provides the 
most rigorous conditions for matching the data.  Sixth, total law enforcement spending is 
exogenously determined.  Law enforcement budgets are determined by local and federal 
                                                 
7 Data obtained from Monitoring the Future surveys over the period 1975-2004.  
Result is robust to use of data from National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. 
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legislatures.  Such expenditures cannot be modified at the law enforcement level and are 
typically set many years in advance. 
The probability of arrest for each race is a joint distribution cumulative density in 




µγ −− −−= −  
where mi  is the fraction of money allocated toward enforcement in community i  for 
i = w,b ,  µt  is the effective law enforcement budget, γ t  is the effective percentage of 
arrestees converted to informants the following period, and pt
i  is the population in the 
community of race i . 














To ensure that a solution to (3.3) exists, it is necessary that ,, wt
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t pp  and tµ  grow 
at the identical rates.  As a result, per capita effective law enforcement budget is constant, 


























where for bwi ,= , iii pAa /= , and  β  has been defined to take into account both time 
discounting and population growth.  We assume constant values for the racial 
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effective law enforcement budget supply per black citizen,  µb,  and the effective law 
enforcement budget per white citizen,  µw. 





µγ −− −−= − . 
Having bounded the effective law enforcement budget and population ratio, we 
are able to solve equation (3.4) by value function iteration over the range ]1,0[∈ia , 
bwi ,= , and the maximization is taken with respect to ]1,0[∈im . 
We are then capable of observing the sequence of per capita arrest rates by race as 








= , that originate from an initial B-W ratio.  
Since population growth is removed to make the problem stationary, it is necessary to 
redefine β = βdη  where βd  is the rate at which law enforcement discounts future time 
and η  is the population growth rate. 
Due to the nature of the problem we are addressing, we focus only on arrest paths 
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The B-W ratio may follow three possible paths over time: divergence, 
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Hence, the ratio immediately moves toward the underlying ratio of criminal behavior.  In 
















− , until a peak B-W ratio is reached at that 
point, the ratio begins to converge to the underlying ratio. 
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As discussed in the previous section, the distinction between convergence and divergence 
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Figure 3.6 plots the B-W ratio, white arrest rate, black arrest rate, and total arrest 
rate, for a set of initial conditions and exogenous variables that result in DFC.  As 
explained above, variations in β  effect the range of µ  and γ  for which DFC will occur.  
Additionally, for a given µ  and γ , it can be seen that the timing of the peak is 
decreasing in β .  For lower initial B-W ratios, a lower β  is necessary to achieve DFC.  
                                                                                                                                                 
8 In the case of higher per capita arrest rates, the results are similar, but the peak represents movement 
toward converge followed by ultimate divergence. 
 81 
However, when the initial B-W ratio is high, low β ’s result in divergence and higher 
β ’s result in DFC.   
In all such paths, the movement of the B-W ratio down from the peak is always 
precipitated by an increase in the white arrest rate and is followed by a decrease in the 
black arrest rate.  Thus the DFC generated by our model replicates many of the key 
features of the B-W ratios for prostitution and drug offenses observed in the data.   
 




We see in Figure 3.6 that β  must be sufficiently small to achieve DFC.  Since 
DFC is present when there is no forward looking component to police maximization 
functions, β = 0 , it must be that the elements of the model that cause the hump-shaped 
pattern lie entirely within the static maximization problem and the evolution of 
informants.  Additionally, this is the simplest case to solve analytically and empirically 
while providing the best insight into the inner workings of the model. For these reasons, 
we examine the β = 0  case in more detail. 
 
3.3 STATIC PROBLEM 
In the case that β = 0 , the value function of the previous section can be reduced 































































































































Calibration of the model’s parameters is carried out as follows: (i) guess an initial 
γ  and µt{ }t = 0
τ




b{ }, determine A0w , A0b{ }, and (iii) 
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 as t  grows.  We set µt to grow at 1.11% 
each year, the average US population growth rate from 1934-2004, to maintain a constant 
per capita law enforcement budget.  Therefore only µ0  is free to be chosen.  No growth 
in γ is necessary as the arrest rate rises in conjunction with the population. 
We search over positive values of γ  and µ0  using the Nelder-Mead method to 
minimize the sum of squared residuals between our model’s simulated B-W ratio and the 
B-W ratio in the data.  Thus γ  and µ0  are estimated only using data on the B-W ratio.   
For prostitution offenses from 1934-2004, we set the underlying crime 
commission rate, cw and cb , equal to .005 for the entire period.9 Figure 3.7 below 
compares the actual data with our simulation for the B-W ratio, the total number of 
prostitution arrests, the number of white Americans arrested for prostitution, and the 
number of black Americans arrested for prostitution.  Since only the distance from the B-
W ratio was conditioned over during our maximization, the total arrest rates provide a 
rough confirmation of our model’s accuracy. 
The simulation does a nice job of capturing the overall hump-shape seen in the 
data, though the data has a much more pronounced peak.  It also captures the strong 
                                                 
9 These estimates come from the 1992 National Health and Social Life Survey that estimates the percentage 
of the population involved with prostitution at 0.5%. 
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exponential trend in prostitution arrests from through the early 1980s, but fails to match 
the decline of total arrests during the latter part of the sample.  These discrepancies can 
be corrected if we were to increase the underlying crime commission rate and then allow 
it to fall over time. 
 
Figure 3.7: Prostitution Arrests 1934-2004 
 
 
Next simulate the model for a period of very low crime commission rates using 
data on the B-W ratio for drug offenses from 1945-1965.  We exclude observations 
before 1945 since World War II creates a dramatic break in the drug arrest data.  For 
 85 
similar reasons we choose to end the sample in the 1965 before drug use rates skyrocket 
in the late 1960s.  We set the drug use rate, cw and cb , equal to 0.01 for the 1945-1965.10 
Figure 3.8 graphs these results. 
 
Figure 3.8: Drug Arrests 1945-1965 
 
 
                                                 
10 .  This estimate of the drug use rate was chosen as a multiple of the number of drug addicts estimated by 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1954. 
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Our final simulation is for drug offenses from 1970-2004.  For this sample, we set 
cw and cb , equal to 0.08, an estimate derived from the National Household Survey on 
Drug Abuse. 
 
Figure 3.9: Drug Arrests 1970-2004 
 
 
The same four graphs are displayed in Figure 3.9 as were displayed in the 
previous figures and each graph has a plot of the simulation from our model and the data 
from the FBI Uniform Crime statistics.  Similar to the graphs from Figures 3.7 and 3.8 
the model’s simulation of the B-W ratio for drug offenses is smooth compared to the data 
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but captures the trend in the B-W ratio and actual arrests.  Lowering the calibrated drug 
abuse rate results in a better fit of arrests, but reduces the fit of the B-W ratio.  Similarly, 
adding further complexities, including variations to the rate of drug use during the sample 
or random shocks, would enable the model to better match the data and level off in total 
arrests at the end of the sample. We do not document these variations as the goal of this 
chapter is to explain the underlying dynamics of these arrest rates and is not concerned 
with estimating more parameters to match year to year arrest rate volatility. 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
It has previously been believed that elements of racism reside in law enforcement 
today.  Examining this in the area where racism should be most prevalent, victimless 
crimes, we uncover three similar time series of arrest rates that appear to depict the 
existence of racism in law enforcement.  However, through analysis, we provide an 
alternate explanation for such patterns: lack of forward-looking behavior by law 
enforcement. 
This chapter shows that it is possible that given for the proper conditions, it is 
possible for the results of prior racism, a greater number of informants amassed in a 
minority community, to resonate through time if law enforcement agents are concerned 
with maximizing arrests in the current period as opposed to considering the future. 
We have not explored other possible explanations for these DFC paths, which 
may exist.  Instead, we have shown that it is possible to generate such paths for the case 
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of stationary criminal behavior and by rational, non-biased decision making on the part of 
law enforcement. 
Given our findings, this chapter could be taken as making the following policy 
recommendation: Law enforcement agents need to be given sufficient incentives to be 
more forward looking in their behavior in a effort to flush out the remnants of prior 
racism that are still effecting arrest rates today. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Estimated Variance-Covariance Matrix of Model Parameters 
 
c 1 σj W ψ γ0 γ1
c 1 3177.2 -0.65969 -8838.9 -0.033347 0.000114 -1.87E-07
σj -0.65969 0.000465 2.1903 1.07E-06 2.18E-08 -3.21E-12
W -8838.9 2.1903 26530 0.053539 -0.00012 3.66E-07
ψ -0.033347 1.07E-06 0.053539 1.19E-06 -5.44E-09 5.36E-12
γ0 0.000114 2.18E-08 -0.00012 -5.44E-09 3.01E-11 -3.07E-14
γ1 -1.87E-07 -3.21E-12 3.66E-07 5.36E-12 -3.07E-14 3.54E-17  
 
A.2 Hubbert Model (1956) 
 










In equation (A.1)  CXt  is cumulative aggregate oil production in year  t,  TRR  is total 
recoverable reserves,  t0  is the year of peak oil production, and  δ  is a parameter that 
determines the steepness of the logistic growth path.  Differentiating equation (A.1) with 
















where  Xt  is aggregate oil production in year  t.  Solving equation (A.1) for  -δ(t – t0)  and 






δ −= . 
In practice, estimates of  δ  and  TRR  can be obtained by regressing current oil 
production on cumulative oil production and cumulative oil production squared.  The 
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